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Physical layer security: from information theory to security eng....pdf

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Frontmatter
Contents
Preface
Notation
List of abbreviations
Part I - Preliminaries
1 - An information-theoretic approach to physical-layer security
2 - Fundamentals of information theory
Part II - Information-theoretic security
3 - Secrecy capacity
4 - Secret-key capacity
5 - Security limits of Gaussian and wireless channels
Part III - Coding and system aspects
6 - Coding for secrecy
7 - System aspects
Part IV - Other applications of information-theoretic security
8 - Secrecy and jamming in multi-user channels
9 - Network-coding security
References
Author index
Subject index
Physical-Layer Security From Information Theory to Security Engineering This complete guide to physical-layer security presents the theoretical foundations, prac- tical implementation, challenges, and benefits of a groundbreaking new model for secure communication. Using a bottom-up approach from the link level all the way to end-to- end architectures, it provides essential practical tools that enable graduate students, industry professionals, and researchers to build more secure systems by exploiting the noise inherent to communication channels. The book begins with a self-contained explanation of the information-theoretic limits of secure communications at the physical layer. It then goes on to develop practical coding schemes, building on the theoretical insights and enabling readers to understand the challenges and opportunities related to the design of physical-layer security schemes. Finally, applications to multi-user communications and network coding are also included. Matthieu Bloch is an Assistant Professor in the School of Electrical Engineering of the Georgia Institute of Technology. He received a Ph.D. in Engineering Science from the Universit´e de Franche-Comt´e, Besanc¸on, France, in 2006, and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2008. His research interests are in the areas of information theory, error-control coding, wireless communications, and quantum cryptography. Jo ˜ao Barros is an Associate Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering of the Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade do Porto, the Head of the Porto Delegation of the Instituto de Telecomunicac¸ ˜oes, Portugal, and a Visiting Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Information Technology from the Technische Universit¨at M¨unchen (TUM), Germany, in 2004 and has since published extensively in the general areas of information theory, communication networks, and security. He has taught short courses and tutorials at various institutions and received a Best Teaching Award from the Bavarian State Ministry of Sciences and the Arts, as well as the 2010 IEEE ComSoc Young Researcher Award for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Physical-Layer Security From Information Theory to Security Engineering MATTHIEU BLOCH Georgia Institute of Technology JO ˜AO BARROS University of Porto
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, S˜ao Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521516501 C Cambridge University Press 2011 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2011 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library ISBN 978-0-521-51650-1 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
To our families
Contents Preface Notation List of abbreviations Part I Preliminaries 1 An information-theoretic approach to physical-layer security 1.1 Shannon’s perfect secrecy 1.2 Secure communication over noisy channels 1.3 Channel coding for secrecy 1.4 Secret-key agreement from noisy observations 1.5 Active attacks 1.6 Physical-layer security and classical cryptography 1.7 Outline of the rest of the book 2 Fundamentals of information theory 2.1 Mathematical tools of information theory 2.1.1 Useful bounds 2.1.2 Entropy and mutual information 2.1.3 Strongly typical sequences 2.1.4 Weakly typical sequences 2.1.5 Markov chains and functional dependence graphs 2.2 The point-to-point communication problem 2.2.1 Point-to-point communication model 2.2.2 The source coding theorem 2.2.3 The channel coding theorem 2.3 Network information theory 2.3.1 Distributed source coding 2.3.2 The multiple-access channel 2.3.3 The broadcast channel 2.4 Bibliographical notes page xi xiii xv 1 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 13 13 14 18 21 22 23 24 26 29 32 33 37 40 44
viii Contents Part II Information-theoretic security 3 Secrecy capacity 3.1 Shannon’s cipher system 3.2 Secure communication over a noisy channel 3.3 Perfect, weak, and strong secrecy 3.4 Wyner’s wiretap channel 3.4.1 Achievability proof for the degraded wiretap channel 3.4.2 Converse proof for the degraded wiretap channel 3.5 Broadcast channel with confidential messages 3.5.1 Channel comparison 3.5.2 Achievability proof for the broadcast channel with confidential messages 3.5.3 Converse proof for the broadcast channel with confidential messages 3.6 Multiplexing and feedback 3.6.1 Multiplexing secure and non-secure messages 3.6.2 Feedback and secrecy 3.7 Conclusions and lessons learned 3.8 Bibliographical notes 4 Secret-key capacity 4.1 Source and channel models for secret-key agreement 4.2 Secret-key capacity of the source model 4.2.1 Secret-key distillation based on wiretap codes 4.2.2 Secret-key distillation based on Slepian–Wolf codes 4.2.3 Upper bound for secret-key capacity 4.2.4 Alternative upper bounds for secret-key capacity 4.3 Sequential key distillation for the source model 4.3.1 Advantage distillation 4.3.2 Information reconciliation 4.3.3 Privacy amplification 4.4 Secret-key capacity of the channel model 4.5 Strong secrecy from weak secrecy 4.6 Conclusions and lessons learned 4.7 Appendix 4.8 Bibliographical notes 5 Security limits of Gaussian and wireless channels 5.1 Gaussian channels and sources 5.1.1 Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages 5.1.2 Multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian wiretap channel 5.1.3 Gaussian source model 47 49 49 53 55 58 65 76 78 83 90 98 103 103 104 108 110 112 113 118 120 121 127 129 134 136 143 148 162 166 169 170 174 177 177 177 185 190
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